The high levels of poverty, inequality and socio-economic marginalisation that bedevilled Kenya for generations led to a struggle for a new constitutional dispensation, which culminated in the promulgation of a new, egalitarian and transformative constitution in August 2010. This constitution entrenched justiciable socio-economic rights within an elaborate Bill of Rights. Though an important step in the process of the egalitarian transformation of the country, the challenge remains to transform these precepts into practice with their scrupulous implementation through legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks, as well as judicial decision-making. This article argues that, in order to achieve the intended egalitarian transformation, Kenya must adopt a strong interpretive approach, with sufficient foundational standards for the translation of these rights into tangible realities for Kenyans. Kenya must therefore explicitly adopt a minimum core approach for the realisation of these rights to transform them into practical realities for the poor, vulnerable and marginalised Kenyans.
INTRODUCTION
High levels of poverty, inequality and the socio-economic marginalization of the majority of the Kenyan people have been major challenges to the achievement of sustainable development in Kenya. The poverty level in Kenya is among the world's highest, with approximately 46-56 per cent of the population living below the poverty line,' showing no real improvement from the Lecturer, School of Law, University of Nairobi, Kenya. 1 officially estimated poverty rate of 48 per cent in 1981.2 According to data from the International Fund for Agriculture and Development, the overall poverty situation is worsening, rather than improving as is the trend in other developed and developing states, with estimates that, since the post-election crisis of 2008, the poverty headcount has increased by 22 per cent and the measure of severe poverty has gone up by a startling 38 per cent. 3 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Human Development Index (HDI, which measures development in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment and standards of living) has consistently ranked Kenya as a low human development country. In 2013, Kenya was 145th among the 186 ranked countries of the world, 4 showing a slight human development regression from its previous position of 143 out of 187 The Committee on the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) has noted that ethnic tensions and continued ethnic violence are due to the failure by the state to address ethnic and regional disparities in the enjoyment of economic and social rights, leading to resentment. The committee has therefore urged the state to enhance resource allocation to address disparities in access to socioeconomic goods and services, especially in historically marginalized areas and communinties. This should be aimed at the reduction of inequality through employment and the government's resource capacity to provide basic services; climate change which has led to increased drought, crop failure and an exponential increase in the prices of basic commodities; 8 international forces of globalization; skewed international trade; and the international economic downturn of 2008-09. 9 Inequality, which is intricately linked to poverty and socio-economic marginalization, has also been a major challenge in achieving the objective of making Kenya a middle-income economy. Despite evidenced economic growth in the recent past, 10 inequality" is still highly entrenched in Kenyan political, economic, social and cultural spheres, with Kenya ranking among the most unequal countries in the world. 12 In Kenya, inequality and deep human development disparities exist between rich and poor people, men and women, rural and urban areas, uptown and informal settlements, and between different regions and groups. The high inequality is intricately linked to the skewed distribution of state resources among different geographical areas and different communities in Kenya, leading to increased exclusion and marginalization. Inequality is manifested by huge disparities in income, lack of equal access to productive assets, social and political exclusion, and the inability of certain groups in society to access key social services. 13 The World Bank's World Development Indicators 2011 indicate that inequality in Kenya is so high that, in the African region, it only compares favourably with that in South Africa, a country that had suffered many years of apartheid. The inequality Gini coefficient index 14 for Kenya is 48 per net/docs/pullingapart-mini.pdf> (last accessed 8 June 2013), inequality is: "The degree to which distribution of economic welfare generated in an economy differs from that of equal shares among its inhabitants ... It is observed not only in incomes but also in terms of social exclusion and the inability to access social services and socio-political rights by different population groups, genders and even races." 12 Tegemeo Institute Agricultural Policy and Development, Egerton University "Rural incomes, inequality and poverty dynamics in Kenya" (2009) at 2, available at: <http:// www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/Working%2papers/Tegemeo-WP30-Rural-incomesinequality-povertydynanics-Kenya.pdf> (last accessed 13 June 2015). 13 Id at4. 14 The Gini coefficient varies within a range of 0 to 1, with 0 indicating perfect equality between households, while 1 indicates perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient of most African countries ranges from about 0.40 to 0.50, while most developed countries cent, as compared to 57.8 per cent for South Africa, 37.6 per cent for Tanzania and 29.8 per cent for Ethiopia. 15 These dire inequality indicators are confirmed by the World Bank's poverty and inequality assessment report, which indicates that the ratio of consumption between the top and bottom 10 per cent of the Kenyan population stood at 20:1 in urban areas and 12:1 in rural areas. This compares adversely with the ratio of consumption in Tanzania that stood at 5:1 and that in Ethiopia, which stood at 3.3:1.16
The rampant poverty, inequality and political as well as socio-economic marginalization discussed above were the major drivers for a new political and socio-economic dispensation, which culminated in the promulgation in August 2010 of a new transformative constitution (the 2010 Constitution Due to the similarities in the wording of the obligations, Kenyan courts should seek guidance from international, regional and comparative foreign national jurisprudence in interpreting these SERs obligations. "In our view, the inclusion of [SERs] in the Constitution is aimed at advancing the socio-economic needs of the people of Kenya, including those who are poor, in order to uplift their human dignity. The protection of these rights is an indication of the fact that the Constitution's transformative agenda looks beyond merely guaranteeing abstract equality. There is a commitment to transform Kenya from a society based on socio-economic deprivation to 36 one based on equal and equitable distribution of resources. This is borne out by Articles 6(3) and 10(2)(b). The realisation of socio-economic rights means the realisation of the conditions of the poor and less advantaged and the beginning of a generation that is free from socio-economic need. ' 4°T herefore, the objective of the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 2010 Constitution, similar to that of other national jurisdictions that have entrenched such rights in their constitutions, is to facilitate the eradication of poverty and inequality, improve the overall standards of living of all people and ensure social justice.
41 To achieve these objectives, a strong normative interpretive approach, with sufficient foundational standards and tests for the translation of abstract SER norms into tangible realities for the rights-holders, is crucial. 42 This article proposes that the realisation of these goals in essence necessitates that, apart from the duty to realise SERs progressively, Kenya must explicitly adopt a minimum core approach to realising the entrenched SERs, an approach which requires the state, at the very least, to provide the most vulnerable of its citizens with the minimum essential levels of the entrenched SERs. This article aims to analyse the potential of the minimum core approach in the realisation of the entrenched SERs in the 2010 Constitution. After this introduction it analyses the foundational origins of the minimum core approach, before undertaking an analysis of the legitimacy of the development of the minimum core approach at the international level by the treaty monitoring mechanisms that have the mandate to interpret treaty provisions and how this percolates to the national level. Taking this legitimacy into account, the article then analyses the viability of the adoption of the minimum core approach in Kenya, before considering the embryonic jurisprudence of the Kenyan courts in relation to the minimum core approach. There follows an examination of the minimum core approach in two comparative jurisdictions: South Africa where the Constitutional Court has failed to embrace the minimum core approach; and Colombia, where the Constitutional Court has adopted a wholehearted espousal of the minimum core approach in its SER jurisprudence. The article thus proposes that Kenya should follow the Colombian example and adopt the minimum core approach with the aim of enhancing the achievement of the transformative aspirations of the 2010 Constitution. The article closes with a short conclusion.
THE FOUNDATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS
The minimum core approach entails two related components: the minimum core content that defines the nature or essential elements of an SER without which the right loses its substantive significance as a human right; and the minimum core obligations, which are the immediate measures a state must put in place to realise the minimum essential levels of an SER. 44 The minimum core approach was developed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its effort to establish a minimum legal substance for the SERs entrenched in the ICESCR, with the aim of enhancing the prioritization of the socio-economic needs of most poor and vulnerable groups. 45 It was developed as an intrinsic component of the standard of "progressive realisation" and the CESCR determined it as follows: "[a] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party. Thus, for example, a state party in which a significant number of individuals are deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary healthcare, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic form of education is, prima fade, failing to discharge its obligations under the [ICESCR] ." The CESCR further stated that a reading of the ICESCR obligations devoid of the minimum core is tantamount to depriving them of their raison d'ftre. The committee has thus been at the forefront of developing a comprehensive minimum core jurisprudence detailing the content of the SERs in the ICESCR. 47 The importance of developing the minimum core content of SERs was affirmed by Phillip Alston, who argues that the logical implication of terming SERs as rights is that SERs must give rise to some minimum entitlements, the absence of which must be considered to be a violation of states' SER obligations. 48 The development of the minimum core relates closely to the "basic needs" paradigm developed under the 1976 World Employment Conference, which espoused the commitment of all ILO member states to provide: "(i) the minimal consumption requirements needed for a physically healthy population (food, shelter, clothing); (ii) access to essential services and amenities (safe drinking water, sanitation, health and education); (iii) access of all to adequately remunerated employment opportunities; and, (iv) the satisfaction of the needs of a more qualitative nature (a healthy humane environment, and popular participation in making decisions that affect the lives and livelihoods of the people and their individual freedoms)." 49 This basic needs paradigm, like the minimum core content approach, is based on human dignity and finds expression in the understanding that human dignity is entrenched in the material and non-material conditions of life required for human survival and happiness. 50 As an ILO member state, Kenya is under an obligation to enforce these standards in accordance with its 1LO commitments, a process of realisation which will go far in fulfilling the minimum core of the entrenched SERs.
The imperative for Kenya, and indeed other states, to adopt these basic minimum standards has been enhanced by the development in international human rights law, especially in the context of the minimum core approach, as evidenced in the General Comments of the CESCR, to the point that resource constraints are no longer a justification for a state to fail to meet its minimum core obligations. This progression commenced from the CESCR General Comment No 3, which allowed states to use the justification of resource constrains if they failed to realise their minimum core obligations. 51 Despite this concession to resource constraints, the CESCR emphasized that states did not have carte blanche to use this as an absolute defence for their failure to realise SERs, and required a high threshold which would be fulfilled if a state was able to show that it had used all the resources at its disposal to satisfy its minimum core obligations as a matter of priority. 52 In this context, the CESCR stated: "[ijn order for a state party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations."
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The CESCR further emphasized that "even where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State Party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances". 4 In this context, the minimum core approach affirms that, even in highly strained circumstances, the state retains an irreducible obligation to meet the minimum essential needs of those in the most deplorable socio-economic situations. 55 However, the committee contended in subsequent General Comments, such as General Comment No 14 and General Comment No 15, that the realisation of the minimum core was non-derogable and failure to realise it could not be justified by reliance on the lack of availability of resources. General Comment No 14 provides:
"if resource constraints render it impossible for a State to comply fullywith its Covenant obligations, it has the burden ofjustifying that every effort has nevertheless been made to use all available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy, as a matter of priority, the obligations outlined above. It should be stressed, however, that a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable." 56 51 CESCR Gen Comm No 3, para 10, which states that "it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned". 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Id, para 11.
General Comment 15 further provides:
"To demonstrate compliance with their general and specific obligations, States must establish that they have taken the necessary and feasible steps towards the realisation of the right to water. In accordance with international law, a failure to act in good faith to take such steps amounts to a violation of the right. It should be stressed that a State party cannot justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 37 above, which are non-derogable." 57 The principles and guidelines on SERs in the African Charter also acknowledge this progressive shift in the minimum core approach, by stating that they form part of a state's immediate obligations with regard to the implementation of SERs. resource allocation to be prioritized in the realisation of the minimum essential goods and services to the most vulnerable in society, and also entails a stricter standard of judicial review in relation to the courts' enforcement of entrenched SERs.6 1 The jurisprudence shows the shift in international obligations with regard to the realisation of the minimum essential elements of SERs; it is thus imperative that Kenya take this into account when developing the framework for the implementation of entrenched SERs, as well as in SER adjudication.
There are several advantages in Kenya, and indeed any state with justiciable SERs, adopting the minimum core approach with the aim of uplifting the living standards of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups in society. It has been argued that the minimum core approach, with its clear specification of the minimum essential elements that the state must provide, gives the government a better standard with which to monitor implementation and provides better protection for SERs generally, and of the basic needs of vulnerable groups in particular.
62 This is starkly captured by Danie Brand who contends that the interpretation and enforcement of entrenched SERs should, in the first instance, be aimed at "the creation of a society that provides for everyone's basic needs, and that protects everyone against deprivation". 6 3 He argues that a court, in undertaking SER litigation, must determine whether the state is pursuing its constitutionally mandated goal correctly in its policies, and in doing so must, of necessity, develop a contd Rights, guideline 9, available at <https://wwwl.umnedu/humants/instree/Maastricht guidelines.htnil> (last accessed 13 June 2015). Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003, Sun Press) 33 at 36-37. He emphasizes that the real problem to be targeted by efforts aimed at the realisation of SERs should be deprivation and hardship itself. He contends that, in adopting the reasonableness approach, the South African Constitutional Court distanced itself from the concrete particular realities of hunger, homelessness, disease and illiteracy with which the entrenchment of SERs was intended to deal. He enumerates (at 51-56) the negative effects of the reasonableness approach to be: the failure to enhance the realisation of the transformative potential of the constitution; the discouragement of future creative SER litigation aimed at effecting social change; the burdening of indigent litigants with the burden to prove the unreasonableness of state policy;, the availability of limited tools for the courts to deal with subsequent SER litigation; and the lack of substantive standards to guide the state in future socio-economic policy-making.
substantive content to the entrenched SERs.6 4 This has also been affirmed by Sandra Liebenberg who, in her analysis of the Soobramoney judgment, argued that the failure by the South African Constitutional Court (SACC) to expound on the nature, scope and content of the right to health left the state with no clear guidelines for its implementation, thus adversely affecting the capacity of the right to exert a fundamental influence on the state's decision-making concerning social programmes and budgetary allocations.
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The minimum core approach makes it possible for the courts to adopt a more stringent scrutiny in evaluating the state's defences for the nonrealisation of the minimum essential needs of the most vulnerable.
66 It further makes it more feasible for the courts to provide the government with clear timelines within which to implement the court's orders, and also enables the court properly to monitor and supervise compliance with its own orders. 67 This is in line with the constitutional requirement that the courts grant effective relief in instances of violations of constitutionally entrenched human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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THE LEGITIMACY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINIMUM CORE APPROACH AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL AND WHY KENYA SHOULD ADOPT THE APPROACH
The most important question at this juncture is whether there is any obligation on Kenya to adopt the minimum core approach, and how the adoption of the approach can spur on the implementation of SERs. This question raises three pertinent issues for discussion. First, from where do the treaty monitoring mechanisms, especially the CESCR, obtain their legitimacy to interpret the relevant international legal instruments and how does this warrant states' voluntary compliance with the monitoring bodies' interpretations? Secondly, do the monitoring bodies, in their interpretation of the ICESCR and in the development of the minimum core obligations, employ interpretive approaches that are consistent with the rules of interpretation accepted under international law? Thirdly, what has been the practice of states in relation to the These issues are broadly dealt with below, with the objective of making a case for the adoption of the minimum core approach in Kenya.
Interpretive legitimacy and authority of treaty monitoring bodies
The treaties detailing SERs have reporting mechanisms created by state parties to monitor state implementation of the treaties, be it through state reporting, consideration of individual, group or state communications, or by conducting inquiries. The mandates of these treaty bodies give them the authorization to interpret the provisions of relevant treaties in line with their experiences through the formulation of General Comments. Part IV of the ICESCR mandates the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to receive state reports 69 and to produce General Comments to assist states and UN specialized agencies in implementing their obligations under the covenant.
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In order to enhance the implementation of its mandate, ECOSOC created the CESCR in May 1986,71 to take over from the ECOSOC Sessional Working Group of Government Experts that had been monitoring implementation on behalf of ECOSOC from 1976.72 The committee is composed of experts with recognized competence in SERs; they act in their personal capacity, which enhances their impartiality and independence. 73 They also represent different geographical, legal and social systems of the world, enhancing the consideration of different world views in the committee's interpretation of covenant provisions. The CESCR is mandated to submit to ECOSOC a report of its activities, including a summary of its consideration of state reports and general recommendations, so as to facilitate ECOSOC in its responsibilities under articles 22-22 of the covenant. 74 Alston simplifies this mandate into the following responsibilities: "(1) the clarification of the normative content of each of the relevant rights; (2) the encouragement of more meaningful reporting by State parties; (3) the improved cooperation with relevant UN bodies, including the specialised agencies; (4) the facilitation of greater input from non-governmental organisations; and (5) the effective follow-up to the examination of States' reports." 75 Though the CESCR was not specifically established in the ICESCR, as is the norm with other treaty monitoring bodies, its establishment was authorized and done in accordance with the covenant. The fact that its work is mainly aimed at assisting ECOSOC, the body that was conventionally mandated to monitor the implementation of ICESCR, does not detract from the authenticity of its mandate and the legitimacy of its interpretation of the covenant as is encompassed in its Concluding Observations and General Comments.
The legitimacy of the other treaty monitoring bodies which have similarly adopted the minimum core approach in the interpretation of the SERs in their relevant treaties, such as the CEDAW Committee, CRC Committee and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee), have not generated much debate, as their mandates are provided for within the text of the relevant treaties. The CEDAW Committee is established under part V of the convention 76 and article 21 provides for its mandate to make suggestions and adopt General Recommendations based on the consideration of state reports and information received from state parties. The acceptability of its General Recommendations can be gleaned from the fact that, even though CEDAW provides for a system of dispute resolution in instances of a difference in interpretation or application, the system has so far not been used to challenge any of the interpretations of the convention as provided by the CEDAW Committee.
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The CRC Committee is established under part H of the CRC. 78 It is mandated to receive and consider state reports 79 and to make General Recommendations based on information received from state parties and other specialized agencies in accordance with articles 44 and 45. 8 0 Lastly, the CRPD Committee is established under article 34 of the convention with the task of considering state reports; 81 it can also make suggestions and General Recommendations based on the examination of state reports and on information received from state parties.
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Since states have ratified these relevant treaties knowing the mandates of the monitoring bodies, they have, in good faith, undertaken to be bound to accept the authenticity and legitimacy of the General Recommendations emanating from them, and should thus be expected to be bound, or at least to be authoritatively persuaded, by the General Recommendations emanating from these bodies in good faith. In relation to the CESCR, this conclusion is supported by Alston and Qyinn, who contend that, if state parties have ratified the covenant in good faith, and given the CESCR genuine authority as the body charged with interpreting the covenant provisions, then they must, as a necessity, be bound by the interpretation that the CESCR has accorded to the treaty, 76 CEDAW, art 17. 
Compliance of the treaty monitoring bodies with rules of interpretation under international law
On this second question, SERs are part of human rights law, which is part of the larger body of international law. Accordingly, the customary rules of treaty interpretation, albeit with a little adjustment due to the unique nature of human rights instruments, also apply to SERs. 84 The customary rules of interpretation are encapsulated in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 31(1) is especially informative as it calls for treaty provisions to be interpreted in good faith taking into account not only their ordinary meaning (literal interpretation), but also the objects and purpose of the relevant treaty (teleological interpretation) and the context in which the treaty is applied (systematic interpretation). To support article 31 farther, the Vienna Convention provides other aids to interpretation, which include the preparatory works of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. 85 In using these rules to interpret human rights treaties, the monitoring bodies are expected to take into account the objects and purposes of the relevant treaty, and to undertake an expansive interpretation aimed at providing the greatest and most effective protection to individuals and groups.
8 6 This should be done in accordance with the principle of good faith, which requires that ) where the court stated, at para 87, that: "In interpreting the Convention, regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms ... thus the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective." She further discusses the need for an evolutive interpretation of human rights treaties, taling into account developments in international human rights law and in the context of present day conditions, basically adopting the "living instrument principle". She refers (at 80) to the European Court case of Airey v Ireland 32 Eur Ct HR (ser A) (1979) where the court stated in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights, at para 26, that "the Convention must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions and it is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with which it deals". positive rules of law contained in treaties are interpreted and applied honestly, fairly and reasonably. 8 7 The customary norms of treaty interpretation as well as the principle of good faith have been effectively employed in practice by the treaty monitoring bodies in interpreting the contents of the relevant legal instruments. A case in point is the CESCR which has undertaken an expansive interpretation to make the entrenched SER provisions effective and practical in the protection of the relevant groups and individuals. This can be seen in the development of states' minimum core obligations, which are aimed at giving content to SERs to make them practical in the protection of marginalized and vulnerable groups.
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State practice in relation to the General Comments of treaty monitoring bodies On this third issue, and as discussed above, the treaty monitoring bodies are authoritatively mandated to monitor the implementation of the relevant treaties and, as such, have the authority to interpret the scope of the treaties' provisions through General Comments. Through their General Comments, the monitoring bodies have developed the minimum core obligations as being implicit in the obligations of states in accordance with the relevant treaties.
8 9 Even though under traditional international law these General Comments are not legally binding on member states, it is beyond doubt that they carry considerable legal clout. 90 This is reflected in the wide acceptance of the monitoring bodies' General Comments by state parties to those relevant treaties.
91 Kenya, as a state party to the relevant treaties is, therefore, under an obligation to fulfil its obligations under these treaties in good faith, including the realisation of its minimum core obligations on SERs through the adoption of the minimum core approach. Failure to do so will be indicative of bad faith. 92 Sepulveda The Nature of the Obligations, above at note 84 at 88.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIABILITY OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF KENYA'S SER JURISPRUDENCE
It is generally accepted that, where there is doubt with regard to the meaning or import of domestic law, that law should be interpreted in a way that gives credence to the relevant international obligations accruing to the state due to its ratification of international legal instruments. 93 As noted above, Kenya has assumed international SER obligations by ratifying several international and regional legal instruments. The 2010 Constitution acknowledges that all these international human rights instruments, and all the general rules of international law accruing from them, form part of Kenyan law. 94 The SER provisions of these ratified international legal instruments have been interpreted, by the authoritative mechanisms responsible for monitoring the implementation of those instruments, to include the minimum core obligations discussed above. In its development of the minimum core approach, the CESCR endorsed the approach as a guide to states in their domestic implementation and enforcement of SERs 95 with the objective of responding to the perennial SER justiciability challenges of lack of clarity and content. Katharine Young, in her support of the applicability of the minimum core approach at the national constitutional level, contends that the approach can assist national courts in three aspects of adjudicating SERs: the determination of the state's obligations to respect such rights negatively; the determination of the state's obligation to "progressively realise" such rights in their protection and fulfilment; and the determination of the state's obligation to justify any limitation of SERs, using a more stringent external limitation clause such as article 24 of the 2010 Constitution. 97 Taking into account the doctrine of good faith, Kenya must thus be bound to adopt the interpretation of the monitoring bodies on the minimum core obligations and implement them in its legislative, policy and programmatic framework aimed at the realisation of the entrenched SERs, as well as in the adjudicatory practices of the courts. 97 Id at 82-83. In its limitations role, the minimum core approach reverses the onus of proof in SER litigation, with the requirement that, once the claimant has shown that the minimum core of any particular right has not been protected, the onus reverts to the state to show either that it has put in place reasonable legislative measures within its available resources to realise the light in question, or to justify the reasonableness of its limitation of the right in question. In this way, the minimum core turns the SER paper rights into practical reality for claimants. 98 For the importance of adopting the minimum core obligations, see: Limburg Principles, above at note 60, principle 5; and Maastricht Guidelines, above at note 60, guideline 8.
An expansive reading of the SERs entrenched in the 2010 Constitution to incorporate the minimum core approach is envisaged by the constitution itself, especially article 20(2) which provides for the enjoyment of rights in the constitution to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of the rights. This is further buttressed by article 20(3)(b) which calls for the adoption of an interpretation that most favours the enforcement of rights, 99 and article 24(2)(c) which provides that any provision in legislation limiting a right or fundamental freedom must not limit the right to such an extent that derogates from the right's core or essential content. To enhance the standard of living of vulnerable groups and communities, the constitution also entrenches the state's duty to provide for their needs as follows: "[a]ll State organs and all public officers have the duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups within society, including women, older members of society, persons with disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalised communities, and members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities."
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The state's obligation to enhance the socio-economic condition of vulnerable groups and communities is further buttressed by article 20(5)(b) which requires the state to prioritize the allocation of resources towards the realisation of rights as follows: "[i]n allocating resources, the State shall give priority to ensuring the widest possible enjoyment of the right or fumdamental freedom having regard to prevailing circumstances, including the vulnerability of particular groups or individuals."
It therefore follows that, for the entrenched SERs to achieve the purpose for which they were intended, in accordance with article 19(2) of the 2010 Constitution, 10 1 the minimum core obligations envisaged by the entrenched SERs must be upheld. This proposal is in line with the recommendations of the CESCR which has been categorical that an understanding or reading of substantive SERs which does not incorporate the minimum core deprives SERs of their raison d'&tre. In this vein, the CESCR has emphasized the necessity of an extensive and inclusive interpretation of SER obligations, and has categorically called on states not to interpret SER provisions in a way that contd See also CESCR Gen Comm No 9, paras 3 and 15, which require states to interpret domestic legal provisions in a manner that gives credence to their international law obligations and discourages reliance on national laws to defeat international legal obligations.
99 See also 2010 Constitution, art 259(1) which calls for the provisions of the constitution to be construed in a manner that: promotes its purposes, values and principles; advances the rule of law and the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights; permits the development of law, and contributes to good governance.
deprives them of their meaningful content, rendering them ineffective and illusory.1
02
The adoption of the minimum core approach necessitates the development of the substantive content of SERs. This, however, raises another set of questions: how pragmatically to determine the substantive content of the rights; and how a determination of the substantive content of SERs will be beneficial to Kenyans, especially the poor, vulnerable and marginalized. The first question was one of the major concerns that led the SACC to decline to adopt the minimum core approach to the interpretation of SERs. 103 It raises the dilemma of how, in a diverse society with different understandings of minimum essential needs for human survival and well-being, a detailed and comprehensive theory of value can be imposed to determine what the minimum core content of each SER entails.
However, in response to these concerns, the very entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 2010 Constitution can be said to acknowledge the very diversity of society and that different individuals and groups have different needs that must be provided for. These needs can be met either through the adoption by the state of relevant legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks to provide an enabling environment to allow people to meet their basic socioeconomic needs using their own resources, or through the actual provision of basic socio-economic goods and services to individuals and groups who are unable to provide for themselves. This acknowledgment resonates perfectly with the international obligations of the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil SERs, as is entrenched in article 21(1) of the 2010 Constitution.'" This, in essence, therefore places responsibility for the development of the content of SERs squarely on the doorstep of the government, especially the political institutions which bear the major responsibility for developing and implementing measures aimed at the realisation of SERs.
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How then will the political institutions determine the content of SERs? The author submits that there is no need to reinvent the wheel. A lot of work has already been done in the international arena, especially by the CESCR, the African Commission' 0 6 and other international experts, 10 7 to develop the minimum essential elements for most of the SERs entrenched in the constitution. All that is required of the state, therefore (and this can be done almost immediately, without raising arguments about the availability of resources), is to use available international and regional material to develop the minimum essentials to the entrenched SERs, taking into account Kenya's peculiar historical context, priorities and long-term objectives. This should be done specifically by the state's political institutions, especially the legislature and the executive, in their development of the legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the realisation of the SERs entrenched in the 2010 Constitution. If this is done in an inclusive process allowing for the participation of all Kenyan people in accordance with articles 10, 118-19,108 196,109 201110 and 232(1)(d)"' of the constitution, the state will be able to develop a detailed and comprehensive standard detailing the minimum core content of the SERs that is inclusive and acceptable to all Kenyans. As part of the process of developing the minimum core content of SERs, the state must incorporate the requisite achievable targets, indicators, benchmarks and specific timelines to provide guidance in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the plan of action, as well as enabling the public and other watchdog institutions to monitor progress. 112 The minimum core content, as developed by the political institutions, will then be polished by the courts over time, as and when cases dealing with specific SERs come to the courts for interpretation. The adoption of the minimum core approach will be beneficial to the poor, and vulnerable and marginalized individuals, groups and communities because it will breathe life into abstract constitutional provisions and ensure that the government has clear criteria within which to structure its legislation, policies and programmes aimed at implementing the entrenched SERs. Such criteria will involve the development of the content of the abstract SERs in the constitution to ensure that both the citizenry and the government have a dear understanding of the nature, content and extent of the rights provided by the constitutional provisions and a clear understanding of the duties they impose on state institutions. Such criteria are also important for the donor community, international agencies, and national and international NGOs as they can then choose specific aspects within the criteria to fund and also have clear indicators for monitoring the state's policies and programmes for the implementation of SERs.
108 Requires Parliament to facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative as well as other businesses of Parliament and its committees. 109 Requires county assemblies to facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative as well as other businesses of the county assemblies. 110 Contains the principles of public finance which require openness and accountability, including public participation in financial matters.
111 Envisages public participation in the design of the policy and programmatic frameworks for the implementation of entrenched SERs. 
EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE IN THE KENYAN COURTS IN RELATION TO THE MINIMUM CORE APPROACH
Even though Kenya's SER jurisprudence is still in its tender years of development, the current constitution having only been promulgated in 2010, Kenyan courts have already shown a propensity towards an expansive and progressive interpretation of constitutional rights to accord with international law. These can be seen in Kabui Mwai where the court relied heavily on the education provisions of the ICESCR as well as the elaboration of the right to education in the CESCR's General Comment No 13 interpreting the right to education in article 43(1)(f) of the 2010 Constitution.
3
Kabui Mwai dealt with a challenge to the state's policy to put in place a quota system to ensure equitable access to national secondary schools between primary school learners in public and private schools.
1 4 The policy was challenged by the private schools as being discriminatory against their pupils and thus unconstitutional. 11 5 In determining the case, the court aff-ned the importance of the national values and principles of governance enshrined in article 10(2)(b) of the 2010 Constitution, as well as the purposes for the constitutional recognition and protection of human rights: the preservation of human dignity, the promotion of social justice; and the realisation of the potential of all human beings as enshrined in article 19(2) of the constitution. 116 The court further acknowledged that, in interpreting the Bill of Rights, it had to promote the values underlying an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, equity and freedom, as enshrined in article 20(4)(a) of the constitution, as well as abide by its duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups within society as per article 21(3) of the constitution. 11 7 The court also recognized that the entrenchment ofjusticiable SERs in the constitution was aimed at advancing the socio-economic needs of the people, especially the poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups so as to uplift their human dignity, with the objective of achieving an egalitarian transformation of society.
118
Having set this background, the court proceeded to adopt a substantive and contextual conception of equality, borrowing from the concept of "unfair discrimination" as propounded by the SACC in President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo.1' 9 Taking this into account, the court held that not all differential treatment resulted in the violation of the equality and nondiscrimination articles of the 2010 Constitution, and that the state could legitimately put in place affirmative action, as is dearly authorized by article 27(6) of the constitution, to protect and uplift the situation of historically marginalized groups in society. 120 The court thus held that, in order for it to achieve the transformative aspirations of the constitution, it had to temper merit with equity, as the previous policy based on merit alone had occasioned unfairness and prejudice to candidates from public schools who had to compete for the few slots available in national secondary schools from a point of disadvantage, due to a lack of necessary infrastructural facilities as well as financial and human resources.
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Did Kabui Mwai espouse or reject the minimum core approach? Jotham Arwa contends as follows: "[i]n the few cases that have been hieard by the courts since the promulgation of the new constitution, the courts appear to have adopted an attitude that is hostile to the adoption of the minimum core approach. As has been illustrated by the decision in Kabui Mwai, the Kenyan Constitutional Court on 16 September 2011 rejected the application of the minimum core approach."
122
In making this statement, Arwa did not point to any specific paragraph of the Kabui Mwai judgment or any other court documents on the case, nor did he mention any of the earlier cases where the Kenyan courts had categorically rejected the minimum core approach. His statement above might have been premised on the pronouncement of the court in Kabui Mwai that: among others, impact on the nature of the country's economic system. This is because these rights engender positive obligations and have budgetary implications which require making political choices. In our view, a public body should be given appropriate leeway in determining the best way of meeting its constitutional obligations."
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The court may have erred in stating that SERs are ideologically loaded to the point of impacting on the nature of a country's economic system, but it was correct to point out that resources are an important component in the realisation of entrenched SERs and that, due to resource constraints, it would not have been possible to provide all the entrenched SERs to allpeople immediately on demand. This is the very reason why the standard of progressive realisation has been adopted both nationally and internationally in the realisation of SERs. Therefore, the court's contention that a holistic approach that focuses beyond the individual be adopted for the realisation of SERs did not necessarily mean that the court was rejecting the minimum core approach. In this context, it is submitted that Arwa's statement is not only misleading, but may actually be false, as the court in Kabui Mwai was never presented with a minimum core approach argument by any of the counsel in the case, and no submissions were made requiring the court to make a determination of the minimum core content of the right to education. The court was faced with an equality and non-discrimination controversy, which it dealt with substantively and progressively, taking into account Kenya's historical and prevailing contextual socio-economic situation and the values underpinning the constitution, as well as relying heavily on international and comparative law sources. It is thus incorrect to conclude that the court in Kabui Mwai rejected the minimum core approach to the realisation of SERs.
It is clear that the court in Kabui Mwai did not make any pronouncement with regard to the minimum core approach, but this does not answer the question as to the predisposition of the Kenyan courts towards the approach. A case in which the High Court of Kenya did make a pronouncement with regard to the minimum core approach is Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-K) where the court affirmed the state's obligation to realise the minimum core of rights entrenched in article 27 as follows:
"In order for a State to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations due to any event or circumstance, it must demonstrate that every effort has been made within its disposition in an effort to satisfy as a matter of priority the minimum obligations set out in Article 27 as a whole. It is clear from the extract from International Conventions that every party state is bound to flilfil a minimum core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction of a minimum enjoyment of the rights enshrined under Article 27." In this case, however, the court noted the difficulty of determining the minimum core for the realisation of the right to affinnative action due to differing societal needs, a challenge that requires a holistic assessment of the vulnerability of a variety of groups. The court then resorted to the standard of reasonableness, but retained the applicability of the minimum core approach in determining the reasonableness of a measure for the realisation of rights as follows: "[ain issue which would arise is whether the measures taken by the State or State organ to realise the rights awarded by Article 27 are reasonable.
In that regard we think there may be cases or situations where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken or to be taken are reasonable and satisfy the needs and aspirations of all vulnerable groups."
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The dictum from the Federation of Women Lawyers case is thus indicative of the applicability of the minimum core approach in the Kenyan context in relevant circumstances to enhance the protection of SERs.
Applicability of the minimum core approach was further affirmed in an equality and non-discrimination judicial review-case, Jared Juma v Kenya Broadcasting Corporation and Others. 126 This case challenged an employment condition by the state broadcasting corporation that, for a person to qualify for appointment as the managing director of the corporation, they must be below the age of 45 years. The applicant argued that this was discriminatory and contrary to article 27 of the 2010 Constitution as it was introduced arbitrarily to give undue advantage to the acting managing director and to lock out competition for the position.127 In its determination of the constitutionality of the age limit, the court directed itself as follows: The court went on to find that the decision to limit the age of the managing director to 45 years was so restrictive as to be construed as being grossly unreasonable and unconstitutional as it did not conform to the minimum core content of the right to equality and non-discrimination as entrenched in article 27(4) of the 2010 Constitution. 129 The court stated its finding as follows: "[t]he decision was therefore grossly unreasonable as to amount to discrimination It would have been more informative of the court in this instance to elaborate on the right to equality and non-discrimination and to state clearly the minimum as well as the more expansive contours of the right. Such an elaboration would have gone a long way towards crystallizing the content of rights and enhancing the understanding of the minimum core approach for the protection of rights in general and socio-economic rights in particular. Despite the failure in this instance, the court's adoption of the minimum core approach signifies that the approach has application in the Kenyan context and can effectively be adopted in the enforcement of the SERs entrenched in the 2010 Constitution.
In relation to SERs, the willingness of the Kenyan courts to listen to a minimum core argument was affirmed in Okwanda v Minister of Health, where the court, decrying a lack of sufficient evidence and argument made by the applicant in a case regarding the right to health and access to medicine, stated:
"On the basis of the material before the court, I find that at least the Government Hospitals provide healthcare to the petitioner at a cost Whether the form of healthcare provided in these circumstances meets the minimum core obligation or the highest standard is not one that was the subject of evidence and argument before me. The issue of the prohibitive costs involved in accessing the treatment and whether such treatment should be free bearing in mind the necessity to progressively realise these rights was not explored in the depositions and therefore there is no basis upon which I can make a finding one way or the other."
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It is clear from this pronouncement that, if sufficient evidence and cogent arguments are made in relation to the minimum core approach in the adjudication of SER cases, the courts will be willing to listen to and adopt the approach. The work, therefore, is for litigators to bring before the courts cogent arguments and sufficient evidence so that the courts can be moved to embrace the minimum core approach, as litigation in Kenya is adversarial and the courts are reluctant to adopt new approaches for the enforcement of rights of their own volition. 
THE MINIMUM CORE APPROACH IN COMPARATIVE NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: SOUTH AFRICA AND COLOMBIA
A challenge to the minimum core approach in South Africa
The minimum core approach has, however, not received universal acclaim and has faced its fair share of criticism. One of the staunchest critics of the approach is the SACC which has persistently refused to adopt the approach in several SER cases that it has adjudicated.
132 Some of the reasons for the court's refusal are as follows.
First, the court held that, due to the different contextual situation of individuals as well as their diverse and varying socio-economic needs, it is difficult to define the minimum core content. 133 Secondly, the court held that it did not have the information or experience required to be able comprehensively to determine the minimum core content of rights, given the diversity of needs and circumstances of different groups; this differed from the position of the CESCR which had extensive access to, and experience in scrutinizing, several state reports under the ICESCR to enable it to define the minimum core content of rights. 34 Thirdly, the court stated that the textual construction of the relevant provisions of the South African Constitution did not support the adoption of the minimum core approach, as sections 26(1) and 27(1) did not give an independent and self-supporting positive right, but must be read in relation to sections 26(2) and 27(2) which in effect limit or qualify the content of the rights to the standards of progressive realisation, resource availability as well as the reasonableness of government measures aimed at their realisation. 135 Fourthly, the court argued that it was not pragmatic to read the , Juta) 55-1, at 55-9 -55-12; Bilchitz "Health", above at note 62 at 56A-9 -10, especially note 4. Bilchitz especially argues passionately for an independent determination of the content of rights, separate from the determination of the obligations of the state, which he avers are the ones limited by the availability of resources. He argues convincingly that the rationale for recognising fundamental rights is the need to protect inherent basic human interests, which people have by virtue of their human characteristics and not by virtue of the resources at their command. He avers that the available resources only affect the capacity of people to realise these inherent rights, and not the rights themselves. He thus contends that an understanding of the minimum core content into the SER provisions as this would impose unrealistic demands on the state due to the impossibility of giving everyone "access even to a 'core' service immediately". 136 Finally, the court acknowledged its institutional incompetence to undertake the formulation of the minimum core content of rights, holding that "courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political inquiries necessary for determining the minimum core standards". 137 Despite these reasons, the court did not completely reject ever elaborating the minimum core of SERs, holding that the minimum core might be used to determine the reasonableness of a state measure for the realisation of SERs in particular instances.
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David Bilchitz, one of the staunchest critics of the SACC's refusal to adopt the minimum core approach, has responded extensively to the criticism of the minimum core approach provided above. He contends that the approach is aimed at protecting the fundamental interests of individuals as well as prioritizing and ameliorating the plight of the worse off, whose needs are not adequately met by a reasonableness standard that fails to recognize the equal importance of each person in society. 139 He thus states that, taking into account the weighted prioritization he advocates, the minimum core is a flexible standard which takes into account the needs of the differently situated individuals and groups in society, and is thus not rigid and absolutist.
140
As has been pointed out by several authors, even though the court in Grootboom did not expressly take up the minimum core arguments made by the amici curiae [friends of the court] in that case, the inclusion of the contd content of rights separate from the issue of resources, the approach which he advocates, makes it possible to expect the state to take measures to realise rights which are already present as soon as the problem of scarcity of resources is lessened: see Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights, above at note 39 at 40-42 and 215-20. See K McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009) at 176-81 for similar arguments. McLean provides at (179-81) four reasons for adopting her preferred reading; the two critical ones are: first, that the jurisprudential soundness of having a right not restricted by the availability of resources enables the court to align its interpretation of the scope of SERs in accordance with international and comparative norms, and further requires the state to justify failures to realise SERs; and secondly, that it allows for a "wider socio-political understanding of tights as political or ethical daims against the State which stand, even where the State is not able to realise these rights fully". 136 TAC, para 35. 137 Id, paras 37-38. 138 Grootboom, para 33; TAC, para 34. See also Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication, above at note 65 at 148-51 for a similar analysis. 139 Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights, above at note 39 at 208-13. At 212, however, he rejects lexical prioritization (the requirement that the minimum core must be fulfilled for all before maximal needs are attended to) and instead advocates weighted priorities, which require that, in instances where the minimum core cannot be fulfilled, the state must provide justifications for such failure, and that such justifications must be subjected to stringent scrutiny by the courts. 140 Id at 213. requirement that state programmes must be responsive to the urgent needs of those in desperate situations espoused the idea, and the threshold, of the minimum core approach. 141 This can be gleaned from the Grootboom judgment, where the court stated that an understanding of reasonableness requires that the Bill of Rights be read as a whole because society values human beings and wants to ensure that people are afforded their basic human needs. 142 In this context, the court held: "Itihose whose needs are most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving the realisation of the right ... [T]he Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the test." 1 43 The court proceeded to state that human beings must be treated as human beings, failing which the constitution is worth infinitely less than the paper on which it is written.'4 This link portrays the possibilities of mutuality and interrelatedness of the minimum core and the reasonableness approaches that the SACC prefers when adjudicating SERs.
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The espousal of the minimum core approach in Colombia The refusal of the SACC to take into account the minimum core approach in the realisation of SERs is, however, not representative of the practice of other national jurisdictions with entrenched SERs in their constitutions. A wholehearted espousal of the minimum core approach in understanding, implementing and enforcing SER obligations can be seen in national practice in Bilchitz argues (at 144-46) that the Grootboom court would not have reached the decision it did without consideration of some level of minimum core, and undertakes an analysis to prove this point. To support this, he quotes from the Grootboom judgment at para 44 where the court held: "A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality." He concludes (at 147-49) that, in adopting this reasoning, the court adopted the conception of "dignity as integrity" a conception of dignity which supports the adoption of the minimum core content of SERs. 147 The court's commitment to the minimum core approach has been exemplified by its development of the concept of "the minimum conditions for dignified life" or "the right to a vital minimum", a concept constructed from the principle of the social state as entrenched in the constitution as well as the rights to life, human dignity, health, work and social security. 14 8 The right to a vital minimum gave citizens an entitlement to the satisfaction of at least the minimum social needs to enable them to have dignified lives. 149 The concept of the vital minimum has been key in responding to the socio-economic needs of the poor and vulnerable groups in Colombia, as it has served two important purposes: it determined that SERs in the constitution were sufficiently linked with the other "fundamental" rights in the constitution to the point that they could be enforced via the tutela; 150 and it established a vision of SERs focussed on groups with the most pressing needs and demanded the prioritization of government resources for the amelioration of these needs. 1 51 It thus required the state to prioritize its expenditure towards ensuring that all citizens have access to minimum levels of food, clothing and housing, which affected citizens could move the court to enforce through the tutela. This approach has been used in individual cases, such as a case on the right to health, in a situation of 22 tutela actions dealing with a systematic violation implement charges for education, the court, taking into account international human rights law as incorporated in Colombia's domestic jurisdiction through articles 44, 67 and 93 of the constitution, 5 9 held that a right to free primary education was immediately enforceable. 160 Manuel Cepeda-Espinoza, a former CCC judge, has defined the Colombian system of protecting rights as "biting substantive progressiveness". 1 6 ' "Progressiveness" recognizes that: rights are not absolute, and must be developed and expanded within certain limitations; implementation of rights must show advancement accompanied by proof of progress; and advancement should show progressiveness towards the effective enjoyment of rights. 162 The "substantiveness" of the approach is indicated by two phenomena: the adoption of a fixed standard that substantively defines the scope and content of rights (including the minimum core); and the court's ability to give a remedy to individual petitioners while at the same time ordering structural remedies to cover similarly situated people, a contrast to the South African situation exemplified in Grootboom. 163 The "biting" nature of the approach is indicated by the extensive nature of the decisions as they impose government expenditure on implementation, order administrative and policy changes, and prompt regulatory action.
Though not a panacea for the realisation of SERs, the exemplary use of international law, the incorporation of minimum core standards in the adjudication of SERs, the definition of the substantive content of SERs and the court's willingness to make substantive orders for the amelioration of the conditions of poor and marginalized groups in society as exemplified by the CCC's jurisprudence, is a good example for Kenyan courts to follow in SER litigation. Adopting such an approach will ensure that the entrenched SERs have a practical impact on the lives of poor and marginalized individuals and groups in Kenya, the section of society that most requires the realisation of SERs. contd has been unsatisfactory, with 98% of IDPs living in poverty and only 5.5% having adequate housing.
CONCLUSION
Poverty, inequality and socio-economic marginalization have plagued Kenya for a long time, with Kenya recording high poverty and inequality levels as compared to most states within the African region. These challenges led to the fight for a new constitutional dispensation aimed at enhancing human dignity, ensuring substantive equality and lifting living standards of the Kenyan people. Advocacy for a new constitution culminated in the promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010, which entrenched justiciable SERs as a vehicle for improving the living conditions of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized individuals and groups in the country. The mere entrenchment of these rights into a constitution as paper rights is, however, not sufficient; there is still need for their effective as well as scrupulous implementation to improve the practical socio-economic situation of the target groups.
This article has proposed the adoption of the minimum core approach by both the political and the judicial organs of the state in the realisation of SERs so as to enhance the conditions of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups, with the aim of achieving the transformative aspirations of the 2010 Constitution. It has submitted that the direct espousal of international law in the Kenyan domestic legal system as per article 2(5) and (6) of the 2010 Constitution requires that Kenya adopt the minimum core approach in good faith in line with its commitments under international law. The article has further argued that the adoption of the minimum core approach is supported by several provisions of the 2010 Constitution, especially: article 20(2) that provides for the enjoyment of rights in the constitution to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of the rights; articles 20(3)(b) and 259(1) that call for the adoption of an interpretation that most favours the enforcement of rights; and articles 20(5)(b) and 21(3) that require the prioritization of the needs of the most marginalized and vulnerable groups in society. It is submitted that the adoption of the minimum core approach as per these constitutional provisions will enhance the realisation of the purpose for which the rights, especially the SERs, were entrenched in the constitution, which, as per article 19(2), is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all human beings.
